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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 08/07/2011 Accident number: 723 
Accident time: 11:07 Accident Date: 21/07/2007 
Where it occurred: Task: 
AF/1208/12494/MF000





Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 08/08/2007 
ID original source: OPS/ 03/ 01 - 45 Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PMN-2 AP blast Ground condition: rocks/stones 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 08/07/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
use of pick (?) 
use of shovel (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
inadequate equipment (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 




The only report of this accident that has been made available to date was in a UNMACCA 
“Lessons Learned” document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original 
formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more 
information becomes available. 
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
 
File: OPS/ 03/ 01 - 45 
To: See distribution list below [List removed] 
From: [Name removed] 
Date: 8 August 2007 
Subject: Investigation Report and Lessons Learned – [Demining group] Demining 
Accident 
Reference:  
Please find attached the Investigation Report and Lessons Learned from the demining 
accident involving [Demining group] Demining Team 01 that occurred at Datshte Chinar 
Village, Takhir Province on 21 July 2007. 
Regards, [Name removed, Chief of Operations 
United Nations Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan, Kabul, AFGHANISTAN 
 
Lessons learned from [Demining group] demining accident on 21 July 2007 
INTRODUCTION 
An internal investigation team was convened by the Area Manager of AMAC North East 
(Kunduz) into the demining accident involving [the Victim] a deminer from [Demining group] 
Demining Team 01.  The accident occurred at 11.07 hours on 21 July 2007 at Task: 
AF/1208/12494/MF0009 located near to Dashti Chinar Village, in Rostaq District of Takhar 
Province.  The accident resulted in face, eye, hand and chest injuries to the deminer and 
destroyed his helmet and PPE. 
 
SUMMARY OF EVENTS 
The demining task site was located on a hillside in rocky terrain that was heavily 
contaminated by Anti-Personnel mines (AP mines).  Over the period of the clearance 
operation Demining Teams had located and destroyed 59 x PMN-2 Russian AP mines and 2 
x UXO.  Just prior to the accident the deminer was performing excavation drills using a folding 
shovel and pick and requested to take a break as he was bored, which was granted. 
Demining team management claim the deminer was injured when he laid his helmet and PPE 
down onto a mine, which was in an un-cleared area, as he was moving back to take a break 
from his work.  The Section Leader who had previously been observing him work was moving 
to observe another party when the accident occurred.  
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The casualty was first evacuated to Rustaq Hospital, Kunduz and then moved to the German 
PRT Hospital in Kunduz for further treatment. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The investigation team made the following conclusions regarding the accident; 
• The accident site had not been preserved intact as is required in AMAS.  
• The injuries received by the deminer were not conducive to him wearing his helmet 
and PPE at the time of the accident as is required when ever inside a hazard area. 
• There was no evidence of the helmet and PPE having been destroyed at the scene of 
the deminers work place.  There was however evidence that indicated the helmet and 
PPE may have been destroyed approximately 7 metres away from the scene of the 
accident in a previously cleared area. 
• There was a 250 gram discrepancy in the total usage of explosive recorded in the 
teams Explosive Records and physically in the explosive store. 
• There was a 50 km discrepancy between the team’s vehicle odometer and its log 
book. 
• Local villagers confirmed some demining team members returned to the clearance 
site after normal working hours. 
• The Team and Section Leader display very poor management, supervision and 
command and control of the work performed by its team. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations shall occur; 
• All IPs are to be reminded of their responsibility to take immediate photographs of a 
demining incident sites, and then preserve the site intact until it is inspected and 
released by the investigation team.  This means nothing should be tampered with or 
removed! 
• All staff are to be reminded that PPE shall be worn at ALL times once moving into the 
hazard area after leaving the administration area. 
• The Team and Section Leader of [Demining group] DT 01 shall be demoted 
immediately to Section Leader and Deminer respectively and re-employed into other 
teams.   
• Accreditation for [Demining group] DT 01 is to remain suspended until such time as a 
new Team and Section Leader has been found and the new team has undergone 
refresher training to be observed by QA Staff from AMAC North East and new 
accreditation is issued. 
• The Area Manager of AMAC North East shall provide a detailed program of revision 
subjects for the [Demining group] DT 01 to achieve prior to it undertaking 
accreditation.  This program is to include specific benchmarks and timelines so as not 
to delay the team’s return to work when all standards have been met. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 914 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 




Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: severe Chest; severe Eye; severe Face; severe Hand 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The activity at the time of the accident is inferred from the injury range and the attempt by the 
field managers to conceal the truth about the activity at the time of the accident. 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the 
investigators found that the Victim was not wearing his visor at the time. Chest injuries also 
imply that he was not wearing his body protection. The secondary cause is listed as a 
Management Control Inadequacy because the investigators found that the group’s managers 
had sought to conceal the real circumstances of the accident after the event. The suspension 
of the group’s accreditation implies that this was not in any doubt. 
Inadequate training is listed under Notes because the investigators determined that retraining 
was necessary – it is notable that this was also necessary for the supervisors. 
The use of a pick-axe and shovel to excavate are the Inadequate equipment listed under 
Notes.  
The Inadequate investigation listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident report. 
The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years in 
contravention of the requirements of the IMAS. That said, the Lessons Learned summary 
implies that a comprehensive and objective investigation was conducted, for which those 
responsible should be applauded. 
 
4 
